It is not easy to establish when it became clear that exposure to asbestos dust posed a health hazard. The conventional view is that the threat was not recognized until the mid to late 1920s. More recently, however, Morris Greenberg, Barry Castleman and others have shown that an asbestos hazard had been identified even before the end of the nineteenth century. Greenberg in particular has gone on to question why it took so many years for the first regulations to be introduced, implying that the Factory Inspectorate was either lax or negligent in permitting an excessive time lag to occur.2 But while there are isolated references to the dangers of asbestos from the late 1890s, there was no compelling medical or scientific evidence against asbestos and no sustained call for regulation until the late twenties. By cobbling together various references it is possible to suggest that the hazards of asbestos were fully appreciated by the government in the early 1900s.3 But any such suggestion is misleading and rests heavily, as Robert Murray has argued, upon the use of hindsight.4 A sentence in the Senior Medical Inspector's 1927 report provides a different perspective on the issue of government knowledge. "The effect of inhaling the many kinds of dust produced in industry is", John Bridge wrote, "as yet imperfectly understood." '5 Hence it is hard to dispute the views, expressed in 1930 by another Medical Inspector of Factories, Edward Merewether, as to why asbestosis had "only recently attracted notice and become a problem in the industry".6 These were that:
1. Significant commercial exploitation of asbestos was relatively new.7 2. The asbestos industry was small and employed comparatively few workers, particularly in dusty processes.8 3. The disease developed slowly and unobtrusively. 4 . The disease was easily confused with tuberculosis. 5 . Affected workers left the industry and therefore fell out of sight of Factory Inspectors. 6. Medical research on the effects of dust inhalation had concentrated on dusts containing free silica.9 To this list might be added a point made by Bridge in his 1928 report, namely, that previous "instructions by Inspectors to press for enclosure of, or the application of exhaust ventilation to, dusty processes in the industry, must have checked the earlier incidence by materially reducing the concentration of dust".'0 2 Greenberg, op. cit., note HMSO, 1925 HMSO, -1932 . 9 Merewether and Price, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 17.
10 PP 1929-30 xiii, Annual report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops, 1928, p. 560.
Before the 1920s
In Britain the first reference to the health hazards of asbestos dates from the 1898 annual report of the Lady Inspectors of Factories. In this the Chief Lady Inspector, Adelaide Anderson, included a section on "certain dusty occupations". Castleman implies that she singled out "asbestos manufacturing processes" for "special attention" because they were particularly dangerous." In reality, asbestos was only one of four "dusty occupations which specially came under observation in 1898 ... on account of their easily demonstrated danger to the health of workers, and because of ascertained cases of injury to bronchial tubes and lungs medically attributed to the employment of the sufferers".12
As regards asbestos, Anderson noted that:
In the case of one particular asbestos works, which I visited with Miss Deane [another inspector], far from any precaution having been taken, the work (sifting, mixing, and carding) appeared to be carried on with the least possible attempt to subdue the dust; hand labour being used where mechanical connivance was possible to obviate it, and no sort of ventilation being applied.13 Deane herself noted that:
The evil effects of asbestos dust have also attracted my attention, a microscopic examination of this mineral dust which was made by H.M. Medical Inspector [Dr Thomas Legge] clearly revealed the sharp, glass-like, jagged nature of the particles, and where they are allowed to rise and to remain suspended in the air of a room, in any quantity, the To return to the Factory Inspectorate's inquiry; the thirty-four page report which this yielded comprised two parts; the first, researched and written by Merewether, presented the findings of a clinical and radiological survey of a group of 363 workers who were "constantly exposed in the course of their daily work to the influence of pure or almost pure asbestos dust".37 In brief, Merewether concluded that "the inhalation of asbestos dust over a period of years results in the development of a serious type of fibrosis of the lungs" which could lead to "complete disablement and to a fatal termination". Although he dismissed age and gender as risk factors, he considered that both the period of exposure and dust concentrations to which workers were exposed did increase risk.38 Although this was gloomy in the extreme, Merewether's findings were not wholly pessimistic. First, he noted that "a certain minimal quantity of the dust" was necessary to bring about fibrosis. Second, "the amount of disablement produced by the development of pulmonary fibrosis in asbestos workers" was "for a number of years . . . surprisingly slight".39 Third inhalation of asbestos dust was the cause of fibrosis, then removal of that dust promised to solve the problem. More practically, the reduction of dust would mean a reduction of the hazard. But this raised questions about what would constitute appropriate reductions, both of the dust and of the incidence of fibrosis. Such questions were not easily answered, for, as Merewether pointed out, there were "insuperable difficulties in ascertaining trustworthy figures of the precise incidence of fibrosis amongst workers in particular asbestos processes". However, something which struck Merewether was "the relatively very low incidence rate of fibrosis" amongst spinners. From this he judged that "in order to prevent the full development of the disease within the space of an average working lifetime, it is necessary to reduce the concentration of dust in the air of the workrooms to a figure below that pertaining to spinning at the time over which these cases were exposed".40 If this were accomplished Merewether anticipated a favourable outcome: the application of measures resulting in the reduction of the concentration of dust in the air in the neighbourhood of dusty asbestos processes will cause, firstly, a great increase in the length of time before workers develop a disabling fibrosis, and secondly, the almost total disappearance of the disease, as the measures for the suppression of dust are perfected.4' Hence, Merewether felt able to conclude that "the outlook for preventive measures is good. That is to say that in the space of a decade, or thereabouts, the effect of energetic application of preventive measures should be apparent in a great reduction in the incidence of fibrosis".42 The second part of the report, written by the Engineering Inspector of Factories, Charles Price, identified the processes which gave rise to dust and recommended various methods for dust suppression.43
The question then to be resolved was: what was to be done? In a letter to Bellhouse, written some six months before publication of the Merewether-Price report, Bridge had observed that "regulations ... will inevitably have to be introduced". Bellhouse's main fear, on seeing Merewether's draft report, was that the "provision of completely adequate mechanical ventilation will not be an easy matter"-hence the instruction to Price to investigate this question further. With Price's report before him Bellhouse's misgivings were lessened, but he recognized that problems remained:
The remedy for these conditions is to be found, as in the case of so many industrial diseases, in the suppression of dust. The second part of the report indicates that this point has only recently been appreciated. As regards the non-textile section of the industry, no serious difficulties arise as regards the application of exhaust ventilation. For health. If he invoked this power, he could then propose a set of "special rules" or require the adoption of such special measures as appeared to the Chief Inspector of Factories "to be reasonably practicable and to meet the necessities of the case".47 However, the Home Secretary had no powers of imposition. If employers objected to the rules and could not persuade the Home Office to change its proposals in a way which they deemed to be satisfactory, they could insist on arbitration. In practice, the Home Office did its utmost to avoid alienating employers and becoming involved in arbitrations which were expensive, time-consuming and usually productive only of compromise regulations. Consequently, it usually tried to secure agreement to regulations before their formal issue. This meant that regulating occupational health normally became a consultative exercise.48 The 1891 Act was superseded by consolidating legislation in 1901 but while this measure, which remained on the statute book till 1937, removed manufacturers' freedom to insist upon arbitration, it retained their rights of objection and extended them to "persons affected", which could include employees. As a result, it did not change the fact that in practice occupational health regulation was a matter for negotiation rather than dictation.49
In his letter to the asbestos firms Wilson informed them that it was the intention of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops to propose a code of regulations for controlling dust. But, he continued, the Chief Inspector "realises ... that the suppression of dust in many of the processes, particularly those in the textile section of the industry, may often be found to involve problems of considerable difficulty from a mechanical point of view." He therefore proposed "that an informal conference of representatives of the principal textile factories should be held to discuss the best procedure to be adopted in the interests both of his Department and the industry". securing the suppression of dust by exhaust ventilation".58 An important aspect of the subcommittee's report was its acceptance of Merewether's judgment that little danger was associated with exposure to dust at concentrations below those which prevailed in spinning departments. As a result, it decided that there were some asbestos processes in which the dust was so low as to be insufficient "in the light of present knowledge, to warrant special recommendations being made for its suppression". Otherwise, "the conditions arising from flyer spinning carried on without exhaust under good general conditions may, it seems to the Committee, be taken as the 'dust datum"'. In other words, wherever dust concentrations exceeded those which prevailed in flyer spinning the need for preventive measures was deemed to be established.59 The sub-committee stressed that its Agreements were "aimed at interfering as little as possible with existing working methods or lay-out of premises".60 Wikeley doubt that all parties sincerely, if mistakenly, believed that the introduction of effective exhaust ventilation was all that was required to solve the problem of fibrosis in asbestos factories. As for the sub-committee's point about the need for minimal interference with working methods and premises, this should be seen in the context of a legislative framework which required and permitted only such regulation as was "reasonably practicable".
With the submission of the sub-committee's report, the way was clear, subject to conference accepting it, for the issue of regulations. Conference reconvened on 17 March 1931 and quickly approved, with only minor reservations, the sub-committee's proposals. It then proceeded to discuss the regulations drawn up by the Factory Inspectorate for improving health standards in the asbestos industry. In the course of discussion, the trade representatives raised several objections. First, on the grounds that it would impose an unwarranted burden on the industry, they took "strong exception" to the requirement that records of the compulsory testing of ventilating equipment be kept for examination by a Factory Inspector. Second, on the grounds that it was contrary to normal practice, they objected to having to provide breathing apparatus for workers involved in preparing carding machines with the apprenticeship system, they strongly opposed the exclusion of young persons from certain processes.64 Notwithstanding these objections, it should not be thought that the manufacturers had suddenly turned truculent. Far from it, for the Factory Inspectorate saw merit in their arguments. Certainly Bridge, in a letter to the Chief Inspector of Factories, showed that he had much sympathy with their position and was content to see the regulations amended to take some account of their objections, for example, with regard to the suggested exclusion of juveniles. He pointed out that Merewether had rejected the notion that there was any relationship between age and susceptibility to fibrosis. Furthermore, he agreed with the manufacturers that the regulation would prevent the training of young people, and that it would be unnecessary if effective ventilation were installed, since this would remove the risk: "The representatives, rightly I think, emphasized the fact that they hoped with these regulations in force to limit the dust to a degree which would not cause injury to health. Their argument is, I think, a fair one and should be favourably considered".65 Subsequently, the clause concerning young persons was amended to the effect that anyone already employed could continue in such employment. However In June, Wilson invited TUC representatives to a meeting, to be held on 8 July, at which the points in question could be fully discussed. In his letter of invitation he informed Smyth that inquiries he had made indicated that it would be difficult for the asbestos industry to accept the suggestion for alternating employment.79 Subsequently he urged the TUC to "consult as wide a circle as possible on the draft regulations"-he meant with individual unions-"so that I may, if possible, be able to submit an agreed code for formal issue".80 On 1 July Smyth sent copies of the draft regulations to various unions, inviting them to provide observations and to send a representative to the 8 July meeting.
Meanwhile Legge produced detailed comments on the draft regulations.81
The 8 July meeting was scheduled to take place at the Home Office at 3.00 p.m. On the morning of the same day trade union representatives, including Legge, held consultations, the outcome of which was nearly three pages of queries. They then proceeded to the Home Office, where they met Wilson, Bridge, Merewether and Price. At the start of the meeting, Wilson explained that he had no power to limit or extend the regulations "but that he wanted to send out a code from the HO which would be agreed to by both the TUC and the employers". In the course of discussion he accepted several of the points made by the union representatives. At the same time he rejected some of their suggestions as either impractical (for example that exhaust ventilation should be mandatory in ship reconditioning jobs), beyond the scope of the Inspectorate's legal powers (for example, that offices, laboratories and other parts of an asbestos works should be sufficiently removed from the manufacturing unit as to ensure that the air was free of fibres), or both unnecessary and certain to provoke objections from employers (particularly the suggestion that the regulations should apply to all asbestos textile processes, including the supposedly safe flyer spinning).82 On several of these points the union side was persuaded of the force of Wilson's arguments. At the end of the conference, Wilson said that "he was quite in sympathy with most of the TUC's suggestions and would do all he could to place their views forcibly before the employers".83 In the circumstances, Wikeley's comment that "the TUC were unable to achieve any of their more far-reaching demands, although they pressed their amendments on the relatively peripheral matters with some success", is fair, even though it understates the value of some of the points (relating to the use of impermeable sacks and the provision of overalls) on which Wilson gave way.84 But equally deserving of emphasis is the point that the employers too were able to modify the rules only at the periphery. On 14 July Wilson wrote to Smyth clarifying a number of points relating to the conference and assuring him that he had "endeavoured to meet as far as possible the suggestions put forward by the Trades Union Congress". He They were, he said, "based mainly on the agreements arrived at with the representatives of the employers". But a number of suggestions made by the TUC had been incorporated, "the others being regarded as unsuitable". He described the scope of the regulations as "very wide" since they would apply to all factories using asbestos or asbestos articles, the only exceptions being where exposure was occasional or intermittent and ship-board work-"the requirements of the present regulations ... [being] ... inapplicable to work of this nature".86 How satisfied was the TUC with the outcome of negotiations? On 20 July Will Sherwood, a member of its 8 July delegation, told Smyth: "While I should have liked to have made one or two further amendments, I believe we have got as far as we can get in this question". Smyth agreed that "we appear to have got as far as we are likely to get at the moment with these Regulations".87 These remarks were less ringing endorsements for the projected regulations than recognition that in any negotiating process compromises have to be made. However, Legge provided a much more positive appraisal. He felt that, following publication of Cooke's 1924 paper, the Home Office had "set speedily to work" to resolve the asbestos problem. He warmly approved the co-operation shown by Factory Inspectors and asbestos manufacturers: "It is a pleasing instance of the readiness now of leading manufacturers in an industry to combine with the Factory Department to do everything practically possible to suppress dust and to pool for the benefit of their industry their experiences in regard to the problems to be solved". That such problems had to be solved was, in Legge's opinion, vital for two reasons. First, there was no "comparatively harmless form of asbestos" and, second, there was no suitable alternative to asbestos. That such views were held by Legge is particularly significant for he had resigned from the Factory Inspectorate in protest against the British government's failure to ban the use of lead in paint when suitable alternatives were available; in other words, he was not necessarily averse to proscription. Legge's final assessment of the proposed regulations was that they "will mark a great advance and perhaps, as the measures for the suppression of dust take effect, will bring about the almost total disappearance of the disease".88 Within a few weeks Smyth seems to have come round to much the same opinion for he informed Wilson of his pleasure at having been able to render assistance in the rulemaking process and of his hope that the regulations "will result in a very big improvement in the health of the workers in the asbestos industry".89
The Home Office issued draft regulations on 15 September 1931. There were no objections from asbestos companies and only one from the TUC. The TUC's related to "one small point" in that section of Rule 12 which permitted a young person already employed in a process from which the employment of juveniles was to be prohibited, to continue in such employment. In January 1932 the Secretary of State dismissed the objection.90 The Asbestos Industry Regulations, dated 31 December 1931, came into effect on 1 March 1932.91 In brief, they applied to all factories and workshops in which asbestos was processed or otherwise manipulated. While they did not apply to all areas of the factory, they did cover the dustiest processes. Aside from the preamble and a section of definitions, there were seventeen regulations, many of which contained clauses and sub-clauses. Of these regulations, twelve imposed obligations on employers and five on workers. In essence they sought to prevent the creation of dust and, where it was created, to prevent, either by the installation of exhaust ventilation or through the provision of breathing apparatus, the workforce from being exposed to it. From a medical authority of Legge's credentials who was, moreover, in the employ of the TUC, this was a ringing endorsement of the high standards achieved by Turner Brothers.
Conclusion
It supported the opinion of Joseph Nuttall, secretary of the Rochdale Weavers' Association, who was "satisfied that the system in operation at Messrs Turner Bros, Rochdale is adequate for the purpose".'°°Hence, at least as far as TBA is concerned, the charge that asbestos employers showed "a reluctance ... to accept safety standards beyond the bare minimum to meet the risks", would seem to be unsustainable.101 In any case, in assessing such a charge it is important to ask which of the phrases in this extract, "bare minimum" or "meet the risks", warrants greater emphasis. The thrust of the MerewetherPrice report and of all subsequent moves towards the establishment of the 1931 regulations was that one thing alone was necessary to solve the acknowledged problem of fibrosis among asbestos workers. This was the reduction of dust levels to below the "dust datum".102 Although this expectation eventually proved to be ill founded, there are no grounds to suppose that it was not sincerely held in the late 1920s, throughout the 1930s, and indeed long after. Once this point is accepted it is easy to see why the manufacturers, in particular (though they were supported by Bridge), baulked at what they perceived to be, in the circumstances, unnecessary additional regulations which might undermine their competitiveness.
Of course, the true value of the 1931 regulations can be assessed only by evaluating their effectiveness once they were in operation. Did manufacturers comply with them and did the regulations produce the anticipated improvement in occupational health? Although a full investigation of such questions lies beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that there is clear statistical evidence that the asbestosis mortality rate declined in the years following implementation of the regulations. In 1957 the number of asbestos fatalities recorded by the Factory Inspectorate (18) was 100 per cent higher than the figure for 1931. On the other hand the tonnage of raw and fibre asbestos imported and retained in the UK in 1957 was more than 600 per cent greater than in 1931.l13 Comparisons for different years will yield different results, but one thing is certain: in relation to the size of the asbestos industry, the number of deaths from occupational asbestosis declined from the early 1930s. Richard Doll, who in the 1950s studied the relationship between asbestos and lung cancer, certainly concluded that the 1931 regulations had made the industry safer: "It is clear ... that the incidences both of asbestosis and of lung cancer associated with asbestosis have become progressively less as the number of years during which men were exposed to the pre-1933 conditions has decreased".'04 Georgiana Bonser et al. were still more explicit:
. . . it must be emphasised that since the introduction of regulations for the control of asbestos dust in 1931, the amount of exposure of the workers to dust has been enormously reduced and we shall therefore expect to see a disappearance of those severe degrees of pulmonary fibrosis that Looking back over the years since 1928 when I first came in contact with your Organisation, I feel we have progressed in the great task of preventing asbestosis quicker than anyone would have expected. This has been very much due to the remarkable way in which the whole Industry, led by yourself, has thrown itself wholeheartedly into the solution of the very complex problems involved.
While we have, as you will agree, a long way to go yet, deaths, the result of very short exposure, do not occur nowadays. I think it unlikely that any other country in the world can say the same.
Perhaps we may be able to tell the Americans something, in this connection at any rate.106
Finally, it is important to place the making of the Asbestos Industry Regulations within their proper context. This article has criticized some scholars for exaggerating, either explicitly or implicitly, certain aspects of the history of the asbestos question. These include the extent of medical and official knowledge of the dangers and the degree to which asbestos was identified as a particularly acute health hazard, the threat from which far outweighed that which was posed by any other occupational disease. It seems likely that such exaggeration owes much to the use of hindsight. In some cases the result has been what might be termed "presentist" history, that is the construction of historical accounts in which current knowledge, concerns, and perspectives dictate the depiction and interpretation of the past. The fact is that in the interwar period Factory Inspectors and others became aware of a number of more or less serious health hazards in the industrial workplace. These included byssinosis, dermatitis, silicosis, and ulcerations brought about by contact with various substances (especially mineral oil and chrome). On the basis of known fatalities, some industrial materials and by-products appeared at the time to be significantly more hazardous than asbestos. Accordingly, Factory Inspectors often devoted more attention to them than to asbestosis. In several instances a regulatory response involving investigations, reports, legislation, conferences with employers and organized labour, and the issue of rules took place.107 In other words, in the period under review asbestos was not seen to be uniquely dangerous, but merely one hazard which could be brought under control, through the sensible application of appropriate measures. 
